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The aim of this paper is to analyse the determinants of sub-central government debt in Europe 
(Italy, France, Austria, Germany, Belgium and Spain) through estimation for each State based on 
corresponding panel data from 1996 to 2010. Furthermore, we estimate the debt model using 
a joint sample, consolidating conclusions on the most influential variables in terms of public 
debt. A comparative analysis of institutional frameworks in Europe shows that relationships 
between central and sub-central tax authorities have common traits, although the extent of 
change in each country remains unknown. In sum, this study shows that sub-sovereign 
government budgets are counter-cyclical, that economies of scale are present, which the golden 
rule of public finance is followed, that population growth and lower per capita financing lead to 
higher debt levels, and that regions characterised by higher debt/GDP ratios tend to have lower 
future deficits. 
 







In recent decades in Europe, political and administrative decentralization processes have been 
carried out, partly driven by the European Union itself. These processes have not been uniform 
and have depended on the internal institutional reforms put in place from different countries. 
While Germany and Austria have a federal nature following  constitutions set out after World 
War II, there are other traditionally more centralized countries in Europe such as Spain, France, 
Belgium or Italy that have been experiencing very dynamic decentralization processes and have 
not yet concluded. 
In the most centralized states, these processes began in the 1970s, with the last reforms of the 
institutional frameworks being implemented as from the year 2000. The common denominator 
of these processes has been to devolve to regions mainly welfare state responsibilities. The 
degree of decentralization has depended on each country, with Germany, Austria, Belgium and 
Spain achieving the highest decentralization level (Table 1). 
 
Table 1. European Regions Responsibilities 
 
Source: Own elaboration  
 
It is obvious that there must be a relationship between the number of responsibilities managed 
by local and regional governments and their weight within total public expenditure. If we 
consider the weight of local and regional expenditure in relation to total public expenditure, the 
most decentralized countries are Germany (57.6%) and Spain (55.18%), while France and Italy, 
the most centralized. (Graphic 1). 
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Graphic 1. Regional and Local Public Expenditure (%) 
  
Source: Own elaboration with Eurostat data. 
 
Debt has been a useful instrument to carry out Sub-sovereign new responsibilities, taking into 
account indebtedness should always be linked to capital expenditures (golden rule). Likewise, 
debt is used in many countries due to the high sensitivity between GDP growth and operative 
revenue. 
Broadly, local and regional debt in the period 2002-2009 has followed high-growth path for the 
European countries analyzed. In Spain, the volume of debt almost doubled, as it grew 90.93% 
while in Italy (61.7%) growth was somewhat more moderate. 
German local and regional entities are undoubtedly the most indebted. German local and 
regional entities as a whole have a debt-to-GDP ratio in 2009 (29.08%), which is almost, double 
that of Spanish (11.55%) or Belgian (10.91%). In addition, the local and regional German debt is 
39.32% of German public debt, while Spanish debt accounts for 20.05% of the Spanish public 
debt. 
Likewise, German local and regional government debt is altogether much higher than that of the 
other countries considered. More than half (60.07%) of the local and regional debt of the 
European countries analyzed is German (Graphic 2), followed by France (13.55%), Italy (11.21%) 
and Spain (10.48%). German local and regional governments are the main issuers in capital 
markets (40.97% of outstanding debt). In second place are the Spanish local and regional 
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Graphic 2. European  Subsovereign Debt 
 
Source: Own elaboration 
 
Regarding the institutional framework of the sub-sovereign countries in the six countries 
considered (Table 2), there is no bail-out clause and the golden rule is fulfilled, i.e., debt is only 
for investments. In addition, in most countries there is a national stability pact that tries to 
convey them the strict rules that countries have to fulfill within the European Union. 
 
Table 2. European Sub-sovereign Institutional Framework 










GERMANY YES NO NO YES YES YES 
AUSTRIA YES NO   YES     
BELGIUM YES NO YES YES YES NO 
ESPAÑA YES NO YES YES YES YES 
FRANCIA NO NO NO NO YES NO 
ITALIA NO NO YES YES YES YES 
Source: Own elaboration 
In most of the countries studied, there are equalization systems to correct the budget revenue 
differences between the richest and poorest regions. The equalization occurs from the central 
government to the regional (vertical), except in Germany that there are both a vertical and 
horizontal equalization (transfers between landers). 
The economic literature in this area is still scarce and rather concentrated in the case of the US, 
Germany and Spain. In Spain, studies have been oriented mainly to verify the effect of fiscal co-
responsibility, the existence or not of soft restraint, market discipline. The contribution of this 
article is twofold: On the one hand, to deal comprehensively with all aspects that may influence 
indebtedness; and secondly,  to apply the specification for the regions of six European countries 














aggregate terms, comparing simultaneously with the same variables and criteria. Authors have 
been mainly inspired by Ellis and Schansberg (1999) and Jannone (2001) specifications for US 
states and Spanish regions respectively. 
Potential implications in economy policy are also relevant to guide changes in the institutional 
framework that allow better compliance with fiscal targets and improve the sustainability of 
public finances. That is, to introduce changes in fiscal co-responsibility, changes in financing 
taking into account demographic and / or size factors, the establishment of additional budgetary 
restrictions or even changes in electoral laws which allow a greater probability of fiscal 
objectives fulfillment.  
In this context, the aim of this paper is to analyze the determinants of sub-sovereign government 
debt in Europe through estimation for each State based on corresponding panel data from 1989 
to 2010, with differences identified by country depending on data availability. European sub-
sovereign governments in Italy, France, Austria, Germany, Belgium and Spain are studied. 
Furthermore, we estimate the debt model using a joint sample, consolidating conclusions on the 
most influential variables in terms of public debt. 
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 presents a literature review about determinants 
of government debt. In section 3, explains a methodology and the explanatory variables. In 
section 4, provides a discussion of the results. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Models used to estimate variables that significantly influence debt and deficit levels are 
structured as panel data, i.e., a combination of individual and time series, in which dummies and 
continuous variables interact based on political, geo-demographic, budgetary and economic 
indicators (Roubini and Sachs 1989). Estimators depend on the year of creation, explanatory 
variables introduced and problems detected or, where applicable, those that may potentially 
appear in affected estimates. Table 3 shows a summary of the literature review in this context. 
Table 3. Literature Review 
Authors Topic Main conclusions 
Hibbs1992;Kantopoulos and 
Perotti 1999 
Public expenditures and 
deficits 
Left-wing parties prefer greater public expenditures and deficits, while 
conservatives have the opposite preference 
Alesina and Drazen 1991; 
Spolaore 1993; Drazen and 
Grillo 1993; Alesina and 
Perotti 1995; Alesina and 
Rosenthal 1995; Velasco 1995 
and 1999; Jannone 2001. 
Government stability and 
deficit 
Stable governments or those with absolute majorities typically have 
lower deficits due to greater ease in decision making and vice versa 
Govinda 1979; Barber and Sen 
1986; Cligermayer 1991; 
Jannone 2001; Monasterio and 
Fernández Llera 2009;  
Political color When the central and regional governments have the same political 
color implies lower debt. 
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Jannone 2001 Political support The support of the regional parties to the Central Government 
generates more debt to the region governed by these parties. 
Nordhaus 1975; Tufte 1978; 
Alesina 1989; Alesina et al. 
1999 
Political cycles Political cycles affect the evolution of public expenditures, with 
increases occurring before elections 
Eichengreen 1992; Poterba 
1994; Ellis and Schansberg 
1999; Monasterio et al, 2000; 
Hemming and Kell 2001; 
Jannone 2001; Vallés and 
Zárate 2003; Ayuso and Casals 
2007. 
Existence of fiscal rules 
and administrative 
controls 
The existence of fiscal rules and administrative controls such as debt 
limits contribute to lower deficits. Furthermore, opportunities to 
establish sanctions and the presence of independent bodies 
responsible for compliance control are key elements that may 
determine the success of fiscal rules 
Lane (1993); Monasterio et al, 
1999; Fernández Llera 2006 
Market  discipline The conditions to have market discipline and existence for the Spanish 
regions 
Monasterio and Fernández 
Llera (2009) 
Region size  Authors define the size variable as the arithmetic mean of the GDP 
weight and population. The result is that the variable is significant and 
positive, suggesting that a larger Community size leads to higher 
deficits, confirming the belief that such Communities should be 
rescued (“Too big to fail”). 
Jannone 2001 Regional economic 
dynamism 
There is a direct relationship between regional economic dynamism and 
deficit levels. More dynamic Communities, i.e., that experiencing 
above-average growth, exhibit higher deficit levels. This is because, in 
the analysed period, there is no fiscal co-responsibility, as only 20-30% 
of revenue is raised directly by Communities. 
García-Milá and McGuire 
1990; Lago-Peñas 2005; 




Several studies conclude that a greater degree of sub-central 
government fiscal co-responsibility, i.e., greater weight of own or 
shared taxes with fiscal capacity over total budget revenue should 
tend to decrease deficits. In fact, the literature finds a positive 
relationship between transfers received by regions and levels of 
expenditure and deficit. 




Negative relationship between GDP growth and Debt 
Monasterio, et al, 2000; 
Monasterio and Fernández 
Llera 2009; Ellis and 
Schansberg 1999; Jannone 
2001 
GDP per capita PPP and 
debt 
Positive relationship (Monasterio, Sánchez and Blanco 2000; 
Monasterio and Fernández Llera 2009 ). 
Negative relationship (Ellis and Schansberg 1999; Jannone 2001). 
Cukierman 1989; Ellis and 
Schansberg 1999 
Ageing and debt More aging more debt. In Ellis and Schansberg article the result is 
different because of the weight of state expenditure on education 







Regarding federalism / fiscal decentralization, there is no consensus on the efficiency of this 
process. For Tiebout (1956), Musgrave (1959) and Oates (1972), decentralization has generated 
efficiency, while for Prud'homme (1994), Hunter and Shah (1996), Ter-Minessian (1997), Afonso 
and Hauptmeier (2009), decentralization has entailed indiscipline and more debt. 
Other studies have addressed market discipline, soft or hard budget constraints, or the effects 
of implementing fiscal rules or administrative controls over debt; the existence of the golden 
rule, the fiscal illusion or countercyclical budgets; the effect of tax co-responsibility, 
demographic and political variables on debt. 
Lane (1993) sets the conditions for market discipline. However, although Monasterio et al (1999) 
demonstrate that there is market discipline (for Spanish regions); Vulovic (2010) says this has 
worked poorly. In fact, Fernandez Llera (2006) points out that market discipline must be 
complemented by administrative controls. Thus, fiscal rules and administrative controls have 
had a debt-reducing effect as shown by Ellis and Schansberg (1999) for US states; and 
Monasterio and Fernández LLera (2009), Monasterio, et al (2000), Ayuso and Casals (2007), 
Vallés and Zárate (2003), Jannone (2001) for Spanish regions. However, for Argimón and 
Hernández de Cos (2008), the fiscal rules do not influence the indebtedness. 
Tax co-responsibility also helps reduce debt. The direct collection of taxes by the regions adds 
transparency to the taxpayers, thus generating discipline. This is demonstrated by Argimón and 
Hernández de Cos (2008), Lago-Peñas (2005), García-Milá and Mc Guire (1990). 
In the case of the Spanish regions, Argimón and Hernández de Cos (2008) show that they have 
a countercyclical behavior. Likewise, Monasterio and Fernández Llera (2009) conclude there is a 
positive relationship between size and debt, which means larger regions believe they will be 
rescued. 
It can also be hypothesized that higher capital expenditures are paired with greater debt given 
that in most sub-sovereign governments, debt can only be used to finance investment. 
Furthermore, from an intergenerational equity perspective, the use of debt to finance 
investment is considered appropriate. Vallés (2002) shows that the weight of capital and 
operative expenditure is significant and positive in relation to deficits, reinforcing fiscal illusions, 
i.e., the impossibility of taxpayers to perceive the true cost of goods and services provided to 
generate political benefits, while the coefficient of capital revenue can be interpreted in the 
opposite sense. Jannone (2001) in turn concludes that net capital expenditures, i.e., 
expenditures with discounted capital revenue, represent a significant positive variable in 
relation to public deficit, while primary operating balance, i.e., the difference between operative 
revenue and expenditures, are also significant but negative. In this way, Spanish regions adjust 
deficit levels as a function of the budgetary margin provided through operative savings for 
finance investment. 
According to the economic literature, GDP per capita in terms of PPP also has influence on the 
outstanding debt. For Monasterio, et al (2000); Monasterio and Fernández Llera (2009) show 
that there is a positive relation of GDP per capita in terms of PPP and debt due to the greater 
use of debt by the greater repayment capability of the debt of the richest regions; In contrast, 
Ellis and Schansberg for the US states. (1999) and Jannone (2001) for the Spanish regions, 
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conclude that this relationship is negative, because a stronger tax collection means less debt 
pressure. 
Financing system shortcomings have also been cited as causes of increased debt. Erroneous 
calculations of real transferred service costs, overestimations of taxes, poor Interterritorial 
Compensation Fund functioning and a lack of levelling subsidies result in increased Community 
debt. The per capita degree of operative financing determines the deficit (Jannone, 2001). In 
this sense, and in the Spanish case, differences in per capita financing between Communities 
partly justify outstanding debt. 
Aging also influences debt. Cukierman and Meltzer (1989) concluded that the more aged regions 
prefer more indebtedness than taxes to increase consumption today at the expense of future 
generations. However, Ellis and Schansberg (1999), in a study specific for US states, show that 
older states prefer taxation because of the spending by states biased towards education. 
Alesina and Drazon (1991), Alesina and Tabellini (1990) and others say that stable governments 
and / or with absolute majority have lower indebtedness. Even this same effect occurs if the 
central and regional government has the same political color. (Govinda, 1979., Barber and Sen, 
1986., Cligermayer, 1991., Monasterio y Fernández Llera, 2009 and Jannone, 2001). 
In Spain, according to Jannone (2001), the support of the regional parties to the Central 
Government generates more debt to the region governed by these parties. However, 
Monasterio and Fernández Llera (2009) and Argimón and Hernández de Cos (2008) find that the 
variable is not significant. 
Likewise, it is also shown that the period before the political elections, public spending, and 
therefore, the debt is raised with the aim of guaranteeing re-election. (Tufte, 1972., Nordhaus, 
1975., Alesina, 1989 and Alesina et al, 1999). 
Argimón and Hernández (2008) conclude that deficits have a high inertia component, as they 
are related to results achieved in the prior fiscal year. This demonstrates that in budgetary 
processes, the results of prior years are considered, removing a considerable degree of 
budgeting flexibility. However, negative dependence between the debt stock and deficit 




The model to be estimated is described as follows: 
 (Direct debt var/GDP)ij =f(pij,   demij, geoij, rij, fsij, ecoij budij lagij)  [1] 
Where, 




demij: demographic variables and size in region “i” in year “j” 
geoij: geographical variables in region “i” in year “j” 
rij: fiscal rules in region “i” in year “j” 
fsij: financing system in region “i” in year “j” 
ecoij: economic variables in region “i” in year “j” 
budij: budgetary variables in region “i” in year “j” 
lagij: lagged variables in region “i” in year “j” 
 
The dependent variable is direct debt variation in each region “i” studied for a period “j”. The 
explanatory variables of equation (1) are specified below, beginning with political indicators, 
demographic and size indicators (Table 4), budgetary and economics variables (Table 5), tax 
rules and structural changes (Table 6). 
The introduction of political variables tries to see if a regional government with an absolute 
majority, sharing the same political color between the central and regional government and the 
support from regional parties to the central government, has some influence on the evolution 
of the debt. The theory and previous studies indicate that they do have influence: Having the 
same political color or an absolute majority generates less debt; while regional governments 
(regional parties in the office) which support the central government raise debt. In addition, 
prior to the polls governments increase spending, and therefore, debt to ensure re-election.   
Demographic variables can also theoretically influence debt, either by population growth, aging 
or population density. The size of the regions is also a variable to consider, since it is possible 
that the larger a region the greater the debt because it believes it will be rescued by the central 
government (“too big to fail”). 
With the inclusion of economic variables in the specifications, it is possible to know whether 
budgets are countercyclical or whether rich regions issue more debt because they have more 
repayment capability or lower debt due to the fact they have a more efficient fiscal system. 
The specification also incorporates budget variables to find if there is fiscal illusion, the golden 
rule or a negative relation between financing per capita and debt through the budget variables; 
and whether the application of more restrictive fiscal rules or changes in financing  models or  
devolution  of new responsibilities have influenced outstanding debt.  Furthermore, the effect 















Table 4. Independent variables: Political, demographic and size indicators 







The presence or absence of an absolute 
majority. It can be expected that 
governments with an absolute majority in 
parliament are not required to make 
concessions for third parties to retain 
governability and thus experience fewer 






the same political 
color=1; 
0=Otherwise) 
The government of the region coincides 
with the political affiliation of the central 
government. According to theory and 
previous articles this situation enhances 
the cooperation with central government 






Election year. In periods close to elections, 
governments spend significantly more 
money on investments and public services 
to retain power. This is pursuant to theory 
and previous studies. 
Positive(+) 
HELP 






 The variable indicates whether the 
autonomous government is composed of 
regional parties that assist the central 
government in its actions due to their 
presence in the Spanish parliament. This is 





POPGROWTH Annual population growth rate. 
Population growth implies an increase in 
expenditures and exerts pressure on 
higher deficits. 
Positive(+) 
POP64A Population over 64 years of age as 
compared to total population. This is an 
indicator of population ageing, and higher 
values translate into greater pressure on 
public expenditure in terms of healthcare 
and social services, and the desire of the 
elderly people is not to pay taxes now. The 
majority of European regions are 
responsible for these types of services. 
Positive(+) 
DENSCOMP Population density of each region in 
relation to that of the country. Greater 
density may generate more expenditure 
due to congestion, but more population 
dispersion could excessively increase the 
expenditure given greater fixed public 
expenditure for extending services to the 
entire population. 
Negative(-) 
SIZEGDP The variables reflecting the relative size of 
a region within a given country are the 
weight of the region’s population in 
relation to total country population and 
the share of regional GDP in the country 
GDP. This is important because small 
relative size could hypothetically generate 
excessive expenditures by public services 




However, the effect to check is “Too big to 
fail”, pursuant to the theory. 
 
 CITYSTATE 




The city variable identifies city-states. The 
absence of economies of scale leads to 
greater indebtedness. 
Positive(+) 
Source: Own Elaboration 
 
Table 5. Independent variables: Budgetary and economic indicators 
 Name Description Expected sign 
Budgetary 
variables 
TAXES The percentage of tax revenue over operative 
revenue. A greater tax weight increases fiscal co-
responsibility, causing citizens of the region to 
identify taxes as a form of revenue collection 
Negative(-) 
STAFF The ratio of the sum of staff expenditures and 
purchases (chapter I+II) in relation to total 
expenditures without taking financial liabilities into 
account. Higher total structural expenditures lead 
to lower flexibility and thus lower capital 
expenditure self-financing, increasing the deficit. 
Fiscal Illusion. 
Positive(+) 
NFCETE The ratio relating operative expenditures, excluding 
financial costs, and total expenditures of each 
region. A high percentage of the operative 
expenditures in the total mean more rigidity and 
less manoeuvrability in management, which 
weakens solvency. Fiscal Illusion. 
Positive(+) 
SAVEBEFINT The ratio relating primary operating balance 
(operative revenue minus operative expenditures 
plus interest payments) to operative revenue. This 
variable is very relevant because greater values 
allow for greater self-financing of investment 
expenditures. Fiscal Illusion. 
Negative(-) 
CAPITAL Capital expenditures plus net variations in financial 
assets minus capital revenue relative to operative 
revenue included in a regional budget. Golden rule. 
Positive(+) 
CAPITALTOINC This variable denotes total capital expenditures 
including those of the public sector, plus net 
variations in financial assets minus capital revenue 
relative to operative revenue. Golden Rule. 
Positive(+) 
FINANR Operative revenue in constant Euros per capita. Negative(-) 
FINANTOTR Total regional financing, excluding debt in constant 





The real per capita financing in relation to the 
average of the regions 
Negative(-) 
FINRMEDESP 
(only in a Spanish 
specification) 
The relationship between operative revenue per 
capita and real mean revenue per capita for the set 
of regions, taking into account responsibilities in 
education and healthcare and the period in which 
these are evaluated, thus indicating whether 
regional per capita revenue are higher or lower 






GDPGROWTH Annual GDP growth rate. This shows if there is a 
countercyclical budget.  
Negative(-) 
PPPREGION GDP per capita of each region in PPP (Purchasing 
Power Parity) terms as compared to the European 
Union mean. A higher level of revenue per capita 
must lead to more capacity for spending and 
greater fiscal capacity of the region’s citizens, which 
leads to higher levels of solvency; or lower debt due 
to the fact they have a more efficient fiscal system. 
Positive(+)o Negative(-) 
DGDPREGSP It is the ratio for regional GDP per capita to the 
national mean for the Spanish case. The expected 
sign for this variable is unknown. On the one hand, 
greater economic development may be associated 
with a more efficient fiscal system and, thus, lower 
deficits. On the other hand, deeper financial 
markets would enable greater access to sub-central 
government indebtedness, increasing public 
deficits 
Positive(+)o Negative(-) 
Source: Own Elaboration 
 
Table 6. Independent variables (Dummies): Tax Rules and structural changes 




SCENARIO It denotes the fiscal rule for the 1992-2002 period 
(Budgetary Consolidation Agreements between the 
Communities and State in which pluriannual scenarios 
were established for debt and deficit limitations) 
Negative(-) 
ZEROLAW It denotes the 2003-2006 period variable corresponding to 
the application of the budgetary stability law approved in 
2002 
Negative(-) 
CYCLELAW It denotes the variable referring to the period of the 
Budgetary stability law modified in 2006, though excluding 
2010. This law take into account the economic cycle in 
surplus/deficit result.  
Negative(-) 
AUSTER It is corresponding to 2010, reflects the period when new 
measures for containing Public Administration 





STABILITY The variable, only present in Italian regions, refers to 
periods characterised by more stringent fiscal rules. 
Negative(-) 
Financing 












Spain: A dummy is associated with the financing system 
2002, the 2002-2008 period. 




Devolution of responsibilities in 2005. 
  
Positive(+) 








The lagged variable included in the model refers to the outstanding debt and debt variation.  In 
the first variable, its sign is expected to be negative, as higher debt levels lead to lower deficits 
in the following period as a logical reaction to avoid excessive deficits in the future, pursuant to 
the theory and previous articles; and the second one, positive pursuant to the inertia effect. 
The construction of regional variables for each country has been a very complex task. No country 
database can be used exclusively to conduct estimates, and not all available information is 
operative. We thus followed a very thorough process that included an information search 
through varied sources to combine data with obtained times series for each region of the 
greatest possible length.  
Regarding regions, almost all European regions from Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy 
and Spain are included within the panel data. 89 sub-sovereigns out of 92 have been introduced.  
The autonomous province of Trento in Italy and Austrian Landers Salzburg and Burgerland are 
excluded due to the scarcity of data. (Table 7). 
 
Table 7. Sub-sovereigns by Country 
AUSTRIA BELGIUM FRANCE GERMANY SPAIN ITALY 
CARINTHIA BRUSSELS ALSACE  BERLIN ANDALUCIA ABRUZZO 
LOWER 
AUSTRIA FLANDERS AQUITAINE BADEN-WURTTENBERG ARAGON BASILICATA 
STYRIA WALLON AUVERGNE BAVARIA ASTURIAS CALABRIA 
TYROL  BASSE NORMANDIE BRANDENBURG BALEARES CAMPANIA 
UPPER AUSTRIA  BOURGOGNE BREMEN CANARIAS EMILIA ROMAGNA 
VIENA  BRETAGNE HAMBURG CANTABRIA FRIULI-VENEZIA-GIULIA 
VORALBERG  CENTRE HESSE CASTILLA LA MANCHA LAZIO 
   CHAMPAGNE ARDENNES LOWER SAXONY CASTILLA LEON LIGURIA 
   CORSE 
MECKLENBURG-WEST 
POMERANIA CATALUÑA LOMBARDIA 
   FRANCHÉ- COMTE NORTH RHINE WESTPHALIA EXTREMADURA MARCHE 
   GUADELOUPE RHINELAND PALATINATE GALICIA MOLISE 
   GUYANE SAARLAND MADRID P.A. BOLZANO 
   HAUTE NORMANDIE SAXONY MURCIA PIEMONTE 
   ILE DE FRANCE SAXONY ANHALT NAVARRA PUGLIA 
   LANGUEDOC-ROUSSILLON SCHLESWIG-HOLSTEIN PAIS VASCO SARDEGNA 
   LIMOUSIN THURINGIA RIOJA SICILIA 
   LORRAINE  VALENCIA TOSCANA 
   MARTINIQUE   UMBRIA 
   MIDI-PYRENEES   VAL D'AOSTA 
   NORD PAS CALAIS   VENETO 
   PAYS DE LA LOIRE     
   PICARDIE     
   POITOU-CHARENTES     
   
PROVENCE  ALPES COTE 
AZUR     
   REUNION     
    RHONE ALPES       




Time frames vary according to the country analyzed: 1996-2010 for Italy; 1989-2010 and 1995-
2010 for Spain; 1999-2010 for France; 1997-2010 for Belgium; 1998-2010 for Austria and 
Germany; and 1999-2010 for all the countries. The data are in annual basis. 
 
Table 8.  Statistics by Country 
 
COUNTRY/VARIABLES BUDGET DEBT ECONOMY DEMOGRAPHIC POLITICS 
AUSTRIA 
Standard and Poor's, 
Moody's,  Austrian 
Statistic Institute, 

















Standard and Poor's, 












Eurostat  and 
Regions Wikipedia 
FRANCE 
Ministry of Interior, 
Moody's, Standard and 


















Institute, Standard and 
Poor's, Moody's, Fitch, 
Deustche Bank, 
Dresdner Bank, HVB, 
Barclays, Unicredit, 
Merrill Lynch 

















Unicredit, HVB Wikipedia 
SPAIN 
Ministry of Finance, 
Standard and Poor's, 
Moody's, Fitch, 
Unicredit 




















(Corte dei Conti), ABN  
Bank, Moody's, 
Standard and Poor's, 
Fitch, UBS, CDC, 
Regions 








Moody's, Fitch Eurostat Wikipedia 





Data were drawn from Eurostat, national statistics institute; Moody’s, Standard & Poor’s and 
Fitch rating agencies; the National and Regional Court of Auditors; banks; central banks; central 
government finance departments; and regions themselves. (Table 8). 
Debt determinant model specifications for regional European entities are estimated from panel 
data for fixed-random effects through the selection of the most efficient estimator based on 
Haussman test results. This estimator is compared with corresponding estimations for 
instrumental variables, where instruments used included GDPGROWTH and/or PPPREGION, and 
the Haussman test is used to check for endogeneity in the conducted estimation because, if this 
were the case, the estimator would be biased. 
In cases of non-endogeneity, if the estimator of fixed effects is more efficient, the hypothesis on 
the existence of serial autocorrelation, contemporary autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity is 
confirmed. If specification problems appear as noted above, the estimation would be repeated 
using feasible generalized least squares corrected for the problems detected. If the most 
efficient estimator is one of random effects, the hypothesis regarding the presence of serial 
autocorrelation would be confirmed. In cases of serial autocorrelation, we would re-estimate 
with the use of generalized least squares corrected for autocorrelation. 
Finally, following static model estimates, the Arellano-Bond estimator (Generalized Method of 
Moments) is used to estimate a dynamic model with difference variables that include the lagged 
dependent variable, i.e., variations in debt to GDP, for one or two periods, and the other 
variables are used for the static model. The Arellano-Bond (1991) test for second-degree serial 
autocorrelation and the Sargan test of over-identification restriction are also conducted.  
 
4. RESULTS  
Equation (1) was estimated for each European country covered in this study based on a panel 
sample, as explained in the methodology. Table 9 shows that for certain countries, estimations 
include random and fixed effects because variables estimated together differ, and thus, both 
are efficient for the set of factors chosen.  
 
Table 9. Estimation results of static models 
 
  Belgium Italy Austria France Germany Spain 





POPGROWTH 1.030**    0.825**      0.069*** 0.057*** 
POP64A 0.520** -0.024*** -0.04 0.330*** -0.004* -0.222*** -0.169***    
DENSCOMP             -0.0007***   
DGDPREGSP             0.0003   
SIZEGDP -0.022**    -0.048***   -0.075*** -0.057** 0.01***   
GDPGROWTH -0.187** 0.009*** 0.067*   0.003 -0.159*** -0.105**  -0.16*** 
PPPREGION -0.0009**  0.006** 0.024**   -0.008*** -0.002 
   
CAPITALINC 0.021* 0.01*** 0.015*** -0.041* 0.015*** 0.135*** 0.153*** 0.016*** 0.047*** 
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NFCETE -0.025* 0.003**   -0.032* 0.011***    
 0.036*** 
STAFF   -0.003 -0.024***   0.004***    
   
TAXES    -0.006 0.037***   0.004**   
 -0.0063*** 
FINRMEDESP             -0.001*** -0.0023*** 
FINRTMEDIA      -0.019**   -0.056*** -0.020*    
FINANTOTR   0.0001***     0.0001*    
   
FINANR             
   
SAVEBEFINT           -0.110*** -0.025***   
S1992             -0.680***   
S1997             -1.099***   
S2002 -0.849**           -1.151***   
SCENARIO             0.879***   
ZEROLAW             0.791***   
CYCLELAW             0.791***   
AUSTER             1.425*** 1.487*** 
HELP             0.115***   
IDENT 0.641        0.626*** 0.906*** 
   
ELECTION 0.475* -0.312*** -0.374**        -0.148***   
MAJOR   -1.320*** -1.389***        
   
STABILITY   0.154*** 0.832***        
   
S2005        0.084***    
   
CITYSTATE           4.884*** 1.970**     
CONS -5.04 0.262 1.823** -4.770*** -1.246*** 9.490*** 5.728*** 0.780*** -2.097*** 
OBS NUM 42 300 300 91 312 208 208 374 272 
GRUPS NUM 3 20 20 7 26 16 16 17 17 
R2 0.463   0.122 0.397     0.428     
Note:  * p-value<0.1, **p-value<0.05 and ***p-value<0.01 
 
The results show that among the demographic variables, for Belgian and Austrian regions, the 
population growth (POPGROWTH) sign and that of populations over 64 years of age (POP64A) 
coincide with expectations; that is, these variables are positive because higher degrees of 
population ageing and greater population growth rates increase expenditures, increasing debt 
levels, and also because, according to the theory, elderly people vote against the rise of tax rates 
for financing the increase of current public expenditure. However, in Italy, France and Germany, 
the POP64A variable presents an unexpected sign.  French regions show little power in the area 
of expenditures, regional entities are not held responsible for social or healthcare spending, 
which form the majority of expenditures in more aged societies. For this reason, given the 
country’s responsibility in education, this negative sign is to be expected, as larger younger 
populations correlate with higher regional expenditures and thus greater debt. Only in the 
Spanish case, population density is significant and negative, reflecting the fact that relatively 
denser communities exhibit greater service accessibility and thus a reduction in direct debt stock 
variation relative to GDP. Moreover, for Spanish regions, the population growth has a positive 
sign like Belgian and Austrian ones. 
The size measured in GDP terms relative to the mean (SIZEGDP) is significant and has a sign 
contrary to expectations and the theory in all countries except Spain. This shows that the effect 
of relative size pressures on the central government for obtaining greater laxity (too big to fail) 
on deficit rules does not work. Furthermore, real GDP growth (GDPGROWTH) indicates that 
Spain, Belgium and Germany are counter-cyclical given their negative relationship between 
indirect debt variations and real GDP growth; i.e., Spanish Autonomous Communities, Belgian 
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regions and German Landers have more resources and fewer needs and thus less debt. 
Meanwhile, Italy reflects highly pro-cyclical behavior, in which GDP corresponds with positive 
debt variations. Real per capita revenue in PPP terms (PPPREGION) thus has a negative sign in 
Belgium and Germany; i.e., greater wealth and revenue lead to greater capabilities for taxation 
and therefore lower debt variation. Meanwhile, in Italy and Austria, the PPPREGION is positive, 
indicating that higher regional real per capita revenue correlate with greater indebtedness, as 
debt repayment capabilities are enhanced. 
Regarding budgetary expenditures, CAPITALINC values reflect the expected sign, validating the 
golden rule in almost all countries (Austria is the exception) in which the increase of capital 
expenditures is financed by debt as described in previous articles. The Fiscal Illusion variables in 
the model such as NFCETE, STAFF and SAVEBEFINT, are fulfilled in the most countries studied. 
In France, Germany, Italy and Spain there is clearly Fiscal Illusion, meanwhile in Belgium and 
Austria it does not exist.  
NFCETE (operative non-financial expenditures to total expenditures) are negative in Belgium and 
Austria, contrary to economic theory, perhaps because regions with a greater share of operative 
expenditures compensate with lower capital expenditures. Meanwhile, Italy, Spain and France 
do show a positive relation, i.e., a greater share of operative expenditures in the total budget 
produces a lower manoeuvre margin and a tendency towards higher debt variations and 
because citizens in these countries don’t know the real cost of the public services. Additionally, 
in Italy, a higher share of staff expenditures in relation to expenditures has a negative influence 
on debt variation, which unexpectedly indicates a substitution effect between staff and 
functioning in expenditures relative to operative transfers. By contrast, this variable is positive 
in France, likely because higher operative expenditures tend to increase debt variations relative 
to GDP due to fewer investment self-financing opportunities. 
Regarding SAVEBEFINT, in Germany and Spain, a higher rate of primary operating balance   
relative to operative revenue implies lower debt variations relative to GDP, suggesting that at 
least a proportion of savings are used to self-finance investment, and justified the existence of 
fiscal illusion. 
As for budgetary revenue, a higher share of tax revenue relative to operative revenue grants 
(TAXES) that theoretically should influence in a reduction of debt due to greater fiscal co-
responsibility and transparency towards the citizens has the sign not expected, except in Spanish 
regions. Total real per capita financing relative to total mean financing in Austria, Germany and 
Spain has a negative sign, suggesting that higher taxes and other forms of per capita revenue 
relative to the mean generate less debt variations relative to GDP, as expected according to 
theory and previous articles. By contrast, real per capita financing is positive in Italy and France, 
contrary to what was expected. Perhaps, in France, establishing a financing system that is 
progressively less linked to changes in GDP and a lower share of own taxes relative to total 
revenue may explain this result.  
Regarding political variables, the influential capabilities are almost insignificant within 
specifications. Variables for absolute majority (MAJOR) presence are only significant in the 
Italian case. MAJOR assumes lower debt variations and coincides with the expected sign, as 
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these cases of greater political support reflect fewer limitations and cessions to govern, thus 
leading to lower debt variations, according to theory and previous articles. 
Variable regional government likeness to the central government (IDENT) theoretically  implies 
the existence of greater cooperation in achieving the fiscal objectives  as both governments are 
from the same political faction, and therefore the expected sign is negative. However, the result 
for German Landers is contrary to expectations.  
The dummy variable which reflects the support from regional parties to the central government 
(HELP)-only in Spanish specifications- can make relaxing the fiscal objectives in compensation of 
the support, and consequently the sign must be positive.  The sign in Spanish specifications is 
positive, pursuant to the expectations. 
For its part, the election year variable is positive only in Belgium, coinciding with expectations 
and theory, i.e., greater pressure on expenditures during election years to ensure re-election. In 
the case of Italy and Spain, the negative sign of this variable may be related to electoral 
expenditures made for re-election purposes in the previous year. 
On the other hand, the implementation of more restrictive fiscal rules for the sub-sovereign 
governments from the central government should press down the outstanding debt, and 
therefore the expected sign should be negative. The result of the fiscal rules on the debt has 
been in general ineffective. It has only worked well in Belgium. In Italy (STABILITY) this may 
perhaps coincide with periods when regions exerted maximum power, and in Spain (SCENARIO, 
ZEROLAW, CYCLELAW, AUSTER) it is assumed that the simultaneity of financing system and fiscal 
rule variables produces interactions.  
Additionally, in Spain the different financing models implemented in the period (1989-2010) 
(S1992, S1997, S2002 and S2009), with additional contributions from the central government, 
have slowed the expansion of debt because the sign is negative; In France, the S2005 variable is 
significant and positive, indicating that during the post-2005 period, there was lower debt 
variation relative to GDP, and this corresponds to regions that assume a greater degree of 
power. Finally, in Germany, the CITYSTATE variable is positive, coinciding with expectations. City-
states present higher levels of debt variation relative to GDP due to limited resources available 
for the provision of certain services, due to the no existence of scale economies. 
For each panel sample, we produced a dynamic model using the Arellano-Bond estimator (Table 
10). In this case, we include lagged variables, catering to its dynamic nature. 
Among the estimates, most of coefficients are significant and have the expected sign, as seen in 
the static regressions, except PPPREGION for Belgium (positive sign in dynamic specification) 
and ZEROLAW for Spain (negative sign in dynamic specification). The lagged dependent variable 
for one period has a positive sign with a coefficient of less than one for all countries, and thus, 
there is certain degree of debt variation inertia. The debt stock variable relative to GDP has a 
negative sign, reflecting a natural tendency towards fiscal consolidation. These results are in line 





Table 10. Estimation results of the dynamic model (Arellano-Bond) 
 
  Belgium Austria France Germany Spain 
IDENT         
  
ELECTION 0.651***       -0.119***   
POPGROWTH 0.860***   -0.103***   0.181*** 0.14* 
POP64A  0.451***      -0.202** 
DENSCOMP 0.017***       -0.020** 0.015*** 
SIZEGDP -0.853** -1.030**     0.521**   
TAXES      0.011*    
STAFF  0.025* -0.008      
NFCETE -0.027***        0.0368*** 
SAVEBEFINT    -0.0098***   -0.024***   
CAPITALINC 0.030*** -0.039***   0.104*** 0.017*** 0.051*** 
FINANR -0.0007**          
FINRTMEDIA  -0.014*   -0.057**    
FINRMEDESP        -0.005***   
GDPGROWTH -0.058***   -0.0043* -0.141*  -0.057*** 
PPPREGION 0.057*** 0.059*      -0.04*** 
DGDPREGSP        -0.057***   
S1992        0.286***   
S2002 -1.457***          
S2005           
S2009        1.196*** 0.997*** 
ZEROLAW        -0.205***   
VDIRDEBTGDP -1 0.535*** 0.183** 0.393*** 0.155** 0.225*** 0.152** 
DEBTTOTGDP-1 -0.893*** -0.423*** -0.391*** -0.142*** -0.091*** -0.115** 
CONSTANTE 17.582 0.556 0.929***   7,581 7.288*** 
OBS NUM 36 77 260 176 340 238 
GRUPS NUM 3 7 26 16 17 17 
m1 -1.509   -1.9394 -1.986 -3.536 -3.2067 
probl 0.131   0.0525 0.047 0.0004 0.0013 
m2 -0.673   -0.64746 -0.569 -0.459 -0.98859 
probl 0.5   0.5173 0.568 0.646 0.3229 
 
Note:  * p-value<0.1, **p-value<0.05 and ***p-value<0.01 
 
 
Below, we estimate representative models for aggregate debt determinants, i.e., for a sample 
in which data for the six countries are analyzed together. First, the period analyzed corresponds 
to the common denominator of the series longitude for each of the studied countries, thus 
bounding the period to 1999-2010. Second, variables that are common to all specifications are 
selected, taking outstanding debt variation relative to GDP as the dependent variable. Finally, 
we add five dummies representing each country with the exception of Spain to absorb 
differential factors. For panel data estimations, the group variable is the region itself, and the 
time variable is the corresponding year. 
Thus, a panel of 1,068 observations and 89 regions is generated, from which static and dynamic 
specifications are conducted. For the former, we selected two that generate the best results. 
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The first is characterised by random effects of robust estimation without serial autocorrelation, 
and the other includes fixed effects that apply the generalised feasible least squares estimator 
due to the presence of contemporary autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity. As none of these 
specifications present endogeneity, these estimates can be confirmed with instrumental 
variables via the Haussman test (Table 11). As for the dynamic specifications, using the Arellano-
Bond method, none have been adequate. Once estimates were performed, the coefficients of 
significant variables reflected the expected sign, except for that representing the relative size in 
terms of GDP, which was expected to have a positive sign (“too big to fail”) This may be because 
larger entities, apart from being able to take on more debt due to central government support, 
have larger scale economies than smaller regions, thus generating less expenditure and less debt 
variation. 
 
Table 11. Estimation results of total regions 
 
 














CAPITALINC 0.02** 0.017*** 
POPGROWTH 0.120*** 0.272*** 
SIZEGDP -0.014** 
 
SAVEBEFINT -0.029*** -0.018*** 
CONSTANT 0.711 0.089 
OBS NUM 1068 1068 
GRUPS NUM 89 89 
R2 0.178 
 
Note:  **p-value<0.05 and ***p-value<0.01 
 
The country dummies were found to be significant with the exception of France, suggesting an 
upward bias in debt variation relative to GDP in German Landers and a negative bias in Italian 
and Austrian regions. The real GDP growth variable is significant with a negative sign, reflecting 
the counter-cyclical nature of regional budgets in European countries. Net capital expenditures 
relative to operative revenue have a positive sign, suggesting that capital expenditures are 
usually financed with debt, complying with golden rule. Finally, primary operating balance to 
operative revenue are significant, presenting a negative sign, suggesting that capital expenditure 
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financing is compensated by a surplus that may be obtained through operative results, and the 
existence of the fiscal illusion. 
Finally, the annual population percentage growth variable is significant and has a positive sign. 
Regions of greater demographic growth experience higher expenditure pressures that are not 
compensated by higher revenue, forcing them into higher debt levels in the future. 
 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
Administrative decentralisation processes in Europe have broadly afforded regions with 
authority for healthcare, education and social services, i.e., welfare state services, in the 
majority of European countries. Based on the pace of decentralization, most of local and regional 
public expenditures rest within the 24.5-12% range measured in terms of GDP. The most 
indebted European regions, both at absolute and relative scales, are German, which, together 
with their Spanish peers, have used capital markets mainly to finance deficits. 
A comparative analysis of institutional frameworks in Europe shows that relationships between 
central and sub-central tax authorities have common traits, although the extent of change in 
each country remains unknown. Almost all countries follow sub-sovereign fiscal rules, stability 
laws, domestic stability plans, equalization systems on the revenue side across regions, no bail-
out clause, and comply with the golden rule that debt should be dedicated to investment.  
Both static and dynamic specifications for the six countries analyzed are consistent and explain 
well the factors that influence the evolution of the debt, but being dynamic specifications the 
best for the debt determinants.  
In determining variables that significantly affect the appearance of deficits in European sub-
sovereigns, a database for each country was constructed, followed by a joint database for all 
European countries. Using panel data and a set of estimations, both dynamic and static, it was 
found that regional European government deficit determinants follow a common pattern, with 
some minor differences, and that variable signs coincide with expectations, pursuant to previous 
studies and the theory. 
This study shows that sub-sovereign government budgets are counter-cyclical, that economies 
of scale are present, which the golden rule of public finance is followed, that population growth 
and lower per capita financing lead to higher debt levels; the existence of fiscal illusion and 
inertial of deficits; and that regions characterised by higher debt/GDP ratios tend to have lower 
future deficits, according to the theory and the former articles. 
However, there are some variables that either are not significant or with a sign no expected. The 
effect of the tax co-responsibility (TAXES) on the debt depends on the country: In Spain the sign 
is negative according to the theory and the previous articles and therefore it illustrates the more 
transparency less debt; but In Austria and Germany the sign is positive. The introduction of more 
restrictive tax rules in some countries have not complied their target and in almost all the 
political variables have not had any influence in debt variation. 
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Furthermore, POP64 and PPPREGION sign also depends on the country. In the first variable the 
sign is positive In Belgium and Austria, explaining more aged region have more debt pursuant to 
the theory, but not in the case of Italy, France, Germany and Spain. In the second one, in Italy, 
Austria and Belgium (dynamic specification) the variable sign is positive according to the theory. 
Variable change sensitivity is found to vary across countries: GDP growth is more sensitive in 
Germany and Belgium. Budgetary variables, such as investment that is not financed with capital 
revenue, primary operating balance and per capita financing, are more sensitive in Germany; 
population growth and real per capita revenue at purchasing power parity are more variable in 
Austria; and the deficit inertia effect and stock debt/GDP reducing effect are more significant in 
Belgium. Using deficit estimates, demographic and financing variables and mean variable values, 
Austria, Germany and Spain were found to exhibit the greatest degree of variability between 
regions, i.e., where models are theoretically the worst calibrated. 
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